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Abstract
In this study, we examined whether small 
countries, when joining the European Union and 
transferring a part of their sovereignty to the EU 
institutions, become economically stronger or 
weaker. We have conducted our assessment 
based on the index of relative concentration of 
power (IRC), which was developed for the pur-
pose of this analysis, modifying the Herfi ndahl-
Hirschman Index. Our analysis has shown that in 
the analyzed period between 2000 and 2015, the 
relative economic power of small member states 
of the EU grew stronger, while, at the same time, 
the relative economic power of large countries 
weakened. We started from the assumption that 
small countries, prior to their entry into the Euro-
pean Union, have lower competitiveness due to 
the relatively higher fi xed costs in the public and 
private sector. Large single market of the Euro-
pean Union produces relatively stronger effect of 
economies of scale for small countries compared 
to large countries, which is why their relative 
economic power grows faster than the relative 
power of large countries.
Keywords: small countries, large countries, 
the European Union, business environment, de-
velopment, index of the relative concentration of 
power (IRC).
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1. Introduction 
The global economic crisis ‘hit small countries hardest’ (Rachman, 2009). As ex-
plained in the Financial Times (Rachman, 2009), a few years before the crisis it 
seemed that ‘the era of small countries’ was about to come because during the time 
of prosperity they succeeded in att racting foreign investment which changed signifi -
cantly the quality of life of the population (e.g. Ireland, New Zealand, Chile, the Baltic 
countries, Slovenia, etc.). But, when in the time of crisis foreign investors withdraw a 
relatively small amount of money from small countries, it has signifi cant consequenc-
es for the economic development, which is why the Financial Times concludes that 
‘the international political circumstances are not in favor of small countries’ and that 
‘large countries are now back in fashion’. After the fi rst shock of the crisis on their 
economies, large countries, gathered as ‘G20’, together with OECD, have launched a 
major international campaign on abolishing tax reliefs (‘tax havens’) and privileged 
interpretation and application of the rules, which has been precisely the specifi city of 
a large number of small countries in recent decades. 
By entering the path towards European integration, inspired by Euro-optimism, 
sovereign countries voluntarily limit and transfer a part of their national sovereignty 
to the European Union institutions. Along with Euro-optimism, which aﬃ  rms many 
advantages of European integration and strengthening the role of the European in-
stitutions in all countries of the European Union with major or minor impact, there 
are those who are Eurosceptic, and even Europhobic, who oppose any form of im-
pairment of national sovereignty in favor of European integration. In the mid-2000, 
when the citizens of France and the Netherlands rejected the European constitution in 
a referendum, it was clear that Euro-skepticism was much more widespread than it 
was expected, and that it was not exclusively linked to the nationalist and right-wing 
parties and movements. Last year’s exist of the United Kingdom from the European 
Union confi rmed that Euro-skepticism is not merely a hypothetical democratic pos-
sibility relative to Euro optimism, but a real alternative to the integration processes 
in Europe. There are many public assessments which say that skepticism reached a 
peak last year. Att itudes toward the EU (Wright, 2016) warn of the spread of Euro-
scepticism, particularly in the larger EU countries (France, Germany, Spain, the Neth-
erlands, Greece, etc.). Fewer and fewer people believe in the European Union (The 
Economist, 2016), whereas more people believe that in the future the European Union 
will have to return the jurisdiction to the national states (Wright, 2016). Strengthening 
of Euro-skepticism increasingly encourages the analyses of advantages and disad-
vantages of the European Union in many areas. Euro-optimists see the advantages 
of the European Union in the tremendous eﬀ ects of the free trade between member 
states, opening new possibilities for education and employment, preserving the na-
tional identity of the people within the Union (preserving statehood, language, cul-
ture, etc.), a single currency, monetary policy as an option potentially available to all 
member states, strengthening the peace and tolerance among the member countries.
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Recently, in the scientifi c community of small European countries a new approach 
to European integration has been developed in the form of ‘Euro-realism’ (Bukovskis, 
2016). ‘Euro-realism’ is a direct support to Euro-optimism and a negation of Eu-
ro-skepticism, or, perhaps, more precisely, a variant of Euro-optimism, specifi c for 
small countries of the European Union. Namely, Euro-realists think that economic 
and security advantages provided by the European Union to small countries out-
weigh the losses in political and institutional concession which small countries make 
when joining the Union. Therefore, even though ‘Euro-realists’ can accept a part of 
criticism of the European Union, their view is that the alternative environment for 
small countries, if they were outside the Union, is much worse and more uncertain 
than the current environment in the Union. 
There is a very specifi c form of Euro-skepticism in small former socialist coun-
tries which is sometimes even paradoxical. The citizens in these countries (e.g. Latvia 
(Austers, 2016), Bulgaria (Primatarova, 2016), Croatia (Samardžija, 2016)) are disap-
pointed with the speed of economic development and improvement of living condi-
tions in the European Union, but still, their political elites persist on Euro-realism. 
The authors who research the fi nancial eﬀ ects of European integration on member 
states indicate that these are only estimates based on diﬀ erent methods (Baele et al., 
2004; De Santis and Gérard, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2014). On the other side, Emerson 
et al. (1992) point out that ‘there is no ready-to-use theory for assessing the costs and 
benefi ts of economic and monetary union’. Namely, there are a few authors who are 
focused on the exact calculation of its eﬀ ects (Abadie and Gardeazaba, 2003; Bading-
er, 2005; Kutan and Yigit, 2007; Campos, Coricelli and Morett i, 2014a).
In addition, a special methodological problem is the diversity of the member 
countries (level of development, level of productivity, economic structure, the degree 
of dependence on foreign trade, etc.), which makes it very diﬃ  cult to isolate the pure 
eﬀ ects of integration on economic development. We must also bear in mind that ‘the 
European Union is neither a state, nor a federation, because it does not have a key 
determinant of the country: the monopoly of force against its citizens’ (Alesina, Spo-
laore and Wacziarg, 2005, p. 1537). Based on this, we will set the basic hypothesis of 
the research we want to prove:
H0: Small countries strengthen economically within the European Union, that 
is, the relative economic power of small countries increases within the European 
Union as a whole. 
Auxiliary hypothesis, which supports the basic hypothesis is: 
H1: Relative economic power of large countries decreases within the European 
Union as a whole. 
The expansion of the European Union increases its economic power in relation 
to the rest of the world. However, as in the context of a whole, the power of ‘small’ 
countries strengthens, the relative power of large countries decreases. Of course, 
this does not mean that large countries do not develop within the Union, and that 
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small countries slow the development of large countries. With their economic power, 
large countries constitute the dominant part of the economic power of the European 
Union. The expansion of the European Union contributes to their growth too, but the 
large single market and the reduction of fi xed costs contribute relatively more to the 
growth of small economies. Specifi ed dimension of the single European market cre-
ates relatively greater eﬀ ects of economies of scale for small countries rather than for 
large countries.
2. Theoretical overview 
In more than six past decades of experience with European integration, a consid-
erable literature has been accumulated on the advantages and disadvantages of the 
EU membership. Although there is no strict classifi cation of research, it could be said 
that there are basically two groups of works: (a) papers dealing with the political di-
mension of integration, starting from security to government aspects of integration, 
and (b) papers dealing with economic and development aspects of integration. Of 
course, one should not forget that political and economic integrations are intercon-
nected; therefore, very often literature from these two groups includes both econom-
ic and political aspects of integration. However, there is no complete agreement in 
the literature on the relations between economic and political integration. The views 
are even opposite: economic and political integrations are in relation of substitution 
(Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2000), or in relation of complementarity (Martin, 
Mayer and Thoenig, 2012). Despite the extensive literature on European integration, 
which discusses the benefi ts of the single market and monetary union (Campos, Co-
ricelli and Morett i, 2014a), it is wrong to believe that there is a vast literature which 
demonstrates economic advantages of the EU membership. In one of the fi rst major 
works dedicated to the impact of the European integration on the economic growth, 
Henrekson et al. (1997, p. 1550) determined that membership in the European Union 
has a positive and statistically signifi cant impact on the economic growth, that is, it 
has annual growth of 0.6 to 0.8% of real income. Also, the same analysis showed that 
the transfer of technology is the most important mechanism for increasing growth, 
while the impact of investment was not confi rmed. Analyzing the continuous growth 
of the fi fteen members of the Union in the period 1950-2000, Badinger (2005) estimat-
ed that the GDP per capita in the European Union would be lower by approximately 
one-fi fth if there was no integration since 1950. Crespo Cuaresma, Silgoner and Ritz -
berger-Gruenwald (2008, p. 16) also analyzed the impact of European integration on 
the growth in the fi fteen-member states. Their analysis confi rmed a signifi cant impact 
on the economic growth, which is relatively higher in the poorer EU member states. 
Convergence within the Union contributes to the long-term economic growth. Trying 
to answer the question whether deep integration into the European Union can be 
‘paid’ through higher GDP per capita and greater productivity, Campos, Coricelli 
and Morett i (2014a, p. 25) found that GDP per capita and labor productivity increased 
after joining the European Union in Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Portugal, Spain, 
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Austria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia and Lithuania. The eﬀ ects were also 
slightly lower but positive in Finland, Sweden, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
What authors fi nd surprising is the fact that only Greece had lower GDP per capita 
and lower labor productivity after joining the European Union. New assessment of 
the eﬀ ects done by the same authors (Campos, Coricelli and Morett i, 2014b, p. 4) con-
fi rmed the positive eﬀ ects of the EU membership for all member states (26 countries), 
with the exception of Greece. On average, GDP per capita is now 12% higher than it 
would be for the same countries outside the European Union. Anyhow, the eﬀ ects in 
the growth of GDP are higher than the costs of integration into the Union. LSE study 
on the impact of the single market on cohesion (LSE Enterprise, 2011, p. 8) shows 
that entry into the European Union, that is, the single market, increased the GDP of 
twelve member states by about 6.7% due to the eﬀ ects of trade. Additional eﬀ ect of 
the GDP growth of 3.9% comes from the increased cohesion, so the overall eﬀ ect of 
GDP growth in the period 2007-2009 for 12 members of the Union was 10.6%. Con-
sidering the literature on the implications of the United Kingdom’s membership into 
the European Union, Crafts (2016, p. 10) realizes that literature proves that the EU 
membership raised the income level of the United Kingdom signifi cantly higher than 
the advocates of joining the Union expected in 1970. This is due to the success of the 
European Union in increasing trade and the pressure of stronger competition on the 
growth of labor productivity in the United Kingdom. 
In the European Union, there is no distinction between ‘large’ and ‘small’ coun-
tries. This is one of the reasons why the literature on the eﬀ ects of European inte-
gration on the development of small countries within the European Union is scarce. 
Academic literature on small countries within the European Union is diverse and 
fragmented (Thorhallsson and Wivel, 2006, p. 651). There is no consensus on what 
is meant by a small country in the European Union, what similarities some small 
countries have in their foreign policy, and what impact they have on international 
relations.
2. Research methodology
2.1. Classifi cation of the member states into ‘small’ and ‘large’ countries
To be able to conduct the necessary analysis that will prove or disprove the hy-
potheses, it is necessary to fi rst defi ne a ‘small country’ within the European Union. It 
has already been mentioned that in the literature there is no complete agreement on 
the concept of a ‘small country’. To avoid a debate on the subject, in this paper we use 
Kuznets defi nition of a small country (Kuznets, 1960). Sixty years ago1 Kuznets put 
forward arguments based on which it could be said that a ‘small country’ represents 
1 International Economic Association held an international conference in the Hague in September 
1957 on the subject ‘Economic Consequences of the Size of Nations’ and the works were pub-
lished in 1960. 
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a country with less than 10 million people. Today, there are assessments that his work 
has stood the test of time although the international environment has changed sig-
nifi cantly. Small open countries managed to overcome the ‘penalties of smallness’ 
thanks to globalization and the fact that large countries rely on the development of 
economies of scale to provide endogenous domestic growth (Laurent, 2008, p. 2). 
Meanwhile, new terms such as ‘micro-states’, ‘giant states’ and ‘embedded states’ 
have appeared in the literature (Laurent, 2008, pp. 30-32). Within the Commonwealth 
a small country implies a country with less than 1.5 million inhabitants (Common-
wealth Advisory Group, 1997). Based on the criteria of Kuznets, 28 members of the 
European Union can be classifi ed into two groups: ‘small EU countries’ and ‘large EU 
countries’. The group of ‘small EU countries’ consists of: Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, 
Ireland, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Finland, and Sweden. The group of ‘large EU countries’ includes: Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Hungary, Netherlands, Po-
land, Portugal, Romania, and the United Kingdom.
2.2. Measurement of the economic power of the EU members 
Each member of the Union is diﬀ erent. Therefore, bringing them into the same 
business environment results in the generation of diﬀ erent intensity and diﬀ erent 
forms of impact of the environment on development. To avoid this methodological 
problem, we will try to measure the relative power of ‘small’ and ‘large’ countries 
according to the GDP of the Union as a whole. That is, in accordance with our goal, 
we will try to answer the question whether the European Union represses or encour-
ages the development of small countries, whether they are economically weaken or 
strengthen within the Union.
The basis for the analysis of the concentration of economic power of ‘small’ and 
‘large’ countries of the European Union will be data on GDP of the Union states in the 
period from 2000 to 2015. During this period 13 new countries, out of which 9 ‘small’ 
and 4 ‘large’ countries, joined the European Union. In order to compare the concen-
tration of economic power before and after joining the European Union, we have in-
cluded GDP data from 2000 for 13 new member states. Although we are aware that 
GDP does not describe all aspects of the development of a country, keeping in mind 
its great analytical value for a synthetic assessment of the economic situation in a 
country, we will observe it as a basic feature for comparison of the development of 
the member states of the European Union.
In our analysis, we start from two assumptions:
1. If there is an equal distribution of GDP of a community to entities that constitute 
this community, the economic power of all subjects of the community is equal. 
2. If there is an unequal distribution of GDP of a community to entities that con-
stitute this community, the economic power of the subjects of the community is 
uneven. 
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Therefore, we start from the assumption that inequality in the distribution of the 
total GDP of the European Union between the member states results in inequality of 
their economic power, i.e. unequal impact on social relations in the Union. It is com-
mon, although not justifi ed, that the relative inequality of any economic characteristics 
is measured in the same manner as the inequality of natural features. For example, the 
concentration of 9% of acetic acid is not the same as the concentration of 9% of income 
of one person in a community. Higher or lower concentration of income of the equal 
entities within a whole results in the establishment of higher or lower level of social 
signifi cance or power that is manifested in mutual relations. Analysis of market struc-
tures shows that the increase in the concentration of supply under the control of a pro-
ducer is followed by the growth of its market power, that is, market power becomes an 
instrument for increasing profi ts as well as the productivity of labor.
If we suppose that entities A and B have the same formal and legal status in one 
whole (the community) X, but diﬀ erent values of relative share in the division of 
some size k, so that kA > kB, then the entity A has a higher concentration of k than the 
entity B. If it is:
X A Bk k k  , then:        (1)
and ,A BA B
X X
k ks s
k k
         (2)
are the rates of participation of entities in the distribution of the total value k. Accord-
ingly, it follows that:
sA + sB = 1         (3)
Entities A and B are active entities in the community X. They participate in the 
decision-making in the community X, communicate with each other, contribute to 
the joint problem solving, gain trust of the entities outside the community X, gain 
or lose trust of other entities in the community, etc. Their possession of the relative 
part of the size k of the community X has an impact on the functioning of the whole 
community.
Among the member states of the European Union there are major diﬀ erences in 
the resulting GDP, and in GDP per capita and labor productivity. In our analysis we 
will look at the diﬀ erences in the relative distribution of the Union’s GDP. In order to 
measure the concentration of GDP by member states of the European Union, we will 
use the logical base of Herfi ndahl Index of concentration (Rhoades, 1993). This is an 
index which was proposed in 1945 by Hirschman (Hirschman, 1945), and its mathe-
matic form was set in 1950 by Herfi ndahl (Herfi ndahl, 1950). 
Hirschman-Herfi ndahl Index (HHI) is calculated as the sum of squared relative 
participation of enterprises in the total turnover of the branch: 



n
i
isHHI
1
2
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In the HHI Index, adding the squared relative participation of enterprises in the 
total sales in the market, increases the relative share of large enterprises and reduc-
es the relative share of small enterprises in total, which indicates a relatively higher 
power of large companies. So, for the HHI it is:
1
1


n
i
is   and  1
1
2 

n
i
is
For the needs of our analysis, using the displayed relations, we will formulate an 
index of relative concentration of power (IRC) of the i entity as:


 n
i
i
i
i
s
sIRC
1
2
2
        (4)
In this particular case it will be:
2 2 1A Bs s  , where:        (5)
2 2 and A A B Bs s s s  , but also: 
2 2
2 2 2 2and
A B
A A B B
A B A B
s sIRC s IRC s
s s s s
         (6)
where IRCA and IRCB present a relative measure of squared coeﬃ  cients of participa-
tion of entities A and B in the distribution k, that is, indices of relative concentration of 
power of entities A and B due to the unequal distribution of k. Accordingly, it applies:
1 BA IRCIRC , where BA IRCIRC  .      (7)
In general, it applies:
1
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i
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i
n
i
i
i IRC
s
s
       (8)
So, the sum of IRC is equal to one. Squared participation rates of individual entities 
in the distribution of a common size are absolutely lower than authentic rates, and 
the sum of squares of relative participation is less than 1. Therefore, the IRC shows 
greater relative power of the entity with a larger relative participation and reduction 
in the power of the entity with smaller relative participation in the distribution. Thus, 
the relative increase in the power of one entity, due to uneven distribution, is a result 
of the loss of power of entities in an inferior position in the distribution of a given 
magnitude (Tomaš, 2013).
For each entity, which is a member of the analyzed community, we get IRC of dis-
tribution of some common size. Single IRC can be grouped according to similarities of 
entities, i.e. we can determine the sum of IRC for similar participants. By comparing 
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the obtained sum for each of isolated groups, we come to the conclusion on the size 
of the concentration of power regarding the distribution of the given common sizes. 
In our case, the member states of the European Union (i = 1,…, 28) are classifi ed into 
‘small’ (s), where (j = 1,..., 15) and ‘large’ (l) wherein (l = 1, ..., 13). Accordingly, the 
following applies:
15 13
1 1
1j l s l
j l
IRC IRC IRC IRC
 
    
Comparing the values of IRCs and IRCl in the analyzed period, we will come to the 
conclusion whether the small countries increased or decreased their economic power 
in the European Union.
3. Research results
Using the previously explained method of measuring the relative concentration of 
economic power (IRC) of the European Union member states in the period from 2000 
to 2015, we showed the distribution of the relative economic power of the ‘small’ and 
‘large’ countries of the European Union. In doing so, we used data about nominal and 
real GDP of the member countries in the analyzed period expressed in euros. Also, 
following the dynamics of enlargement of the European Union in the analyzed peri-
od, we performed calculations for the concentration of economic power relative to the 
dynamics of the entry of individual countries into the Union, as well as calculations 
for all 28 current member states, disregarding the year of entry into the Union. It was 
also challenging to analyze the relative concentration of the relative economic power 
in the Eurozone and for the EU member states outside the Eurozone, as well as to 
analyze the consequences of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union.
Applying IRC to the GDP data of the European Union members (28), expressed in 
current prices in the period 2000-2015 (Table 1), we found the following: 
1. IRCs shows a general upward trend. The exceptions are 2001, 2009 and 2014 when 
the IRCs goods declined, retaining a higher level than the previous lowest level, 
which confi rms the general trend of growth (Figure 1).
2. IRCl shows a general downward trend, with the exception of 2001, 2009 and 2014, 
when the IRCl goods slightly increased (Figure 2).
3. Movement of IRC reveals the interdependence between the economy of small 
and large countries in the European Union. Decline in IRCs in 2001, 2009 and 2014 
was preceded by the decline in IRCl in 2000, 2008 and 2013, which confi rms the 
high degree of dependence of the economy of small countries on the dynamics of 
the economy of large countries.
Calculation of IRC on the basis of data on GDP (EU 28) at constant prices during 
the same period, confi rms the already observed trends (Table 2), with minor fl uctua-
tions in changes: 
1. IRCs shows a general upward trend with minor variations in value than in the 
calculation of the current price. The exceptions are 2001, 2008 and 2009, when 
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the IRCs showed a slight decline, but even then it was higher than the previous 
lowest level (Figure 3).
2. IRCl shows a general downward trend, with the exception of 2001, 2008 and 2009, 
when IRCl slightly increased (Figure 4). 
3. The fact that the IRCs increased in 2014, measured in constant prices, while the 
same year it decreased compared to the previous year, measured in current pric-
es, indicates a relatively higher real growth of GDP in 2014 in ‘small’ countries in 
relation to ‘large’ countries. 
The described tendencies are the result of calculating IRC for all 28 EU member 
states in the period from 2000 to 2015. However, in order to resolve the dilemma of 
whether GDP achieved outside the Union, that is when a country was not a member 
of the Union, has a crucial infl uence on the described trends, we performed calcula-
tion of IRC for the actual full members for each analyzed year. At the beginning of 
the analyzed period, when the European Union comprised 15 countries, the value 
of IRC for small countries amounted to 1.64 and for large countries it amounted to 
98.36. Shortly before the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, the value of 
IRC was 1.69 for small and 98.31 for large countries. Before Bulgaria and Romania’s 
entry into the European Union, the value of IRC for small countries was 1.85 and for 
large countries it was 98.15. Prior to Croatia’s entry into the European Union IRC was 
valued at 1.89 for small countries and 98.11 for large countries. The obtained result 
fully confi rms the previous fi ndings (Figure 5 and Figure 6), which suggests that the 
European Union has unique criteria in defi ning business environment for its member 
states, and that in the preparatory period countries, potential members, apply almost 
the same business principles as full members of the Union.
After the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union, a partic-
ular challenge was the simulation of IRC in the Union under the assumption that in 
the analyzed period, the United Kingdom was not a member of the Union. It is obvi-
ous that in the future the decision will result in restructuring the ratio of the relative 
economic power between member states and between ‘small’ and ‘large’ countries. 
Calculation of IRC at current prices shows that the exit of the United Kingdom from 
the Union caused a loss of about 25% of its economic power (Figures 7, 8 and 12). 
Accordingly, in the European Union without the United Kingdom more than 70% of 
economic power (IRC values) will be concentrated in Germany and France. Current-
ly, about 90% of economic power, measured by IRC, is concentrated in four countries: 
Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. After the exit of the United King-
dom from the Union about 90% of the economic power of the European Union will 
be controlled by Germany, France and Italy. If we bear in mind that throughout the 
analyzed period IRC of Italy is declining and that France has almost cyclical trends 
of IRC, the only thing we can conclude is that in the future Germany will have an in-
creasing role in determining the performance of the European economy.
Also, the challenge was to check IRC movement in the Eurozone and the EU mem-
ber states outside the Eurozone. From 2000 to 2003 IRC of Eurozone showed increas-
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ing trend, from 2003 to 2007 it showed decreasing trend, just to rise sharply in 2008 
and 2009, and then it had downward trend until the end of 2015. At the same time, 
there are asymmetric trends in countries that are not members of the Eurozone. Since 
2009 there has been a stable trend of strengthening their relative economic power 
within the Union, while reducing the relative economic power of the Eurozone (Fig-
ures 9 and 10).
A common feature of IRC movement for ‘small’ and ‘large’ countries is noting the 
economic crisis with strong impacts in 2007, 2008 and 2009. Also, it is interesting that 
before the crisis ‘small’ countries had mostly increasing IRC. After 2009, the values 
of IRC are very uneven, which confi rms that the large European market has become 
more volatile for small countries. 
Previous analysis, conducted on the basis of the value of IRC, unambiguously con-
fi rms that in the analyzed period ‘small’ countries within the European Union had 
general trend of faster growth and strengthening of their own economic power than 
the ‘large’ countries of the EU (Figure 11). Therefore, small countries within the Euro-
pean Union strengthen their relative economic power. At the same time, the relative 
economic power of large countries weakens. The determined values of IRCs and IRCl 
confi rm our basic hypothesis (H0) and auxiliary hypothesis (H1). It is clear that joining 
the large market for small countries, which have relatively higher fi xed costs of the 
public and private sector, creates relatively greater eﬀ ects of economies of scale for 
small countries than for large countries. Large market increases demand faster than 
small countries increase production, which is an important initial precondition for 
the success of the economy. Of course, one should bear in mind that ‘small’ EU coun-
tries produce only about 15% of the total GDP of the Union, and that they cannot sig-
nifi cantly change the overall economic situation in the EU, which primarily depends 
on the situation in the economies of the leading ‘large’ countries. Also, all countries of 
the Union, ‘small’ and ‘large’, are not equally eﬃ  cient and their values of IRC do not 
always match with the general trends of the group.
4. Conclusion
Experience with the fi rst more serious economic crisis has shown that the Europe-
an Union is not so economically solidary as much as member states expect, and that 
member states are not ready to protect the general interests of the Union stronger 
than their national interests. The idea of European integration implies the removal 
of all forms of protectionism and discrimination between member countries. Restric-
tion and transfer of a part of national sovereignty to the European Union institutions 
are motivated by the expected benefi ts of the European business environment for the 
development of sovereign state. In small European countries, a variant of Euro-op-
timism is increasingly expanding under the name ‘Euro-realism’. This is a specifi c 
view on European integration from the perspective of Euro-optimists from small 
countries. According to this approach, economic and security benefi ts provided by 
the European Union to small countries far outweigh the losses in the political and 
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institutional concessions that small countries make when accessing the Union. In con-
trast to Euro-optimism that drives European integration and promote the benefi ts of 
a single European Economic Area, in almost all countries of the European Union, 
with more or less political infl uence, there are Eurosceptics who oppose the reduction 
of national sovereignty in favor of European integration. The proliferation of Euro-
scepticism in times of economic crisis, especially in countries where it is more intense, 
confi rms that the European Union has not found its true identity and has not provid-
ed a permanent reproduction of its system of values yet. It turned out that the idea 
of a unifi ed Europe is vulnerable to internal crisis and the crisis in the region. In such 
circumstances, it is reasonable to ask the question about the situation and perspec-
tives of small countries in the European Union which connect their development and 
future with the Union. 
Our goal was to check whether the European integration threatens the develop-
ment of small countries, that is, whether their economic power strengthens or weak-
ens within the Union. Unfortunately, while there is extensive literature on the bene-
fi ts of the European single market and the history of the EU, few studies demonstrate 
the benefi ts of membership in the European Union (Campos, Coricelli and Morett i, 
2014a). Also, as we have demonstrated, evaluations of the real contribution of mem-
bership in the European Union to economic growth are very uneven. Even authors 
who investigate fi nancial eﬀ ects of European integration on member states warn that 
these estimates are based on diﬀ erent methods, because in the achieved economic 
growth it is diﬃ  cult to determine which part of it is the result of integration into the 
Union. Accepting the empirical research on the development of small countries (In-
ternational Monetary Fund, 2013), according to which small countries have limited 
competitiveness due to high fi xed costs of the public and private sector, we started 
from the belief that the integration of small countries into the European Union leads 
to their economic strengthening. Accession to the great single market of the European 
Union produces relatively greater eﬀ ects of economies of scale for small countries 
than for large countries, which means that their economic power grows relatively 
faster than the power of large countries. 
The European Union does not classify member states into ‘large’ and ‘small’, nor 
does it maintain a special development policy of the countries based on their size. In 
such circumstances, we have applied Kuznets’ defi nition of small countries to clas-
sify the EU member states into ‘small’ and ‘large’. Our goal was not to measure the 
relative contribution of economic integration to GDP growth, but to confi rm or deny 
whether the integration into the European Union strengthens or weakens the eco-
nomic power of small countries. Measurement of the economic power of the Union 
member states was done by using the concentration index of relative power (IRC). 
The basis for calculating the value of IRC was data on the relative structure of GDP of 
the Union member states in the period from 2000 to 2015. 
Our analysis has shown that, measured with value of IRC, the economic power of 
small countries relatively grows in the European Union, that is, the relative power of 
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large countries weakens in favor of small countries. At the beginning of the analyzed 
period, in 2000, for the group of small countries IRC had a value of 1.66 and in 2015 it 
was 2.04. Within this period there were slight decreases in its value compared to the 
previous years, 2001 (1.65), 2008 (1.88) and 2009 (1.86). Although the decline was reg-
istered in the movement of individual IRC values in all small countries after the crisis 
in 2008, with the exception of Malta, its value remained higher than the value each 
of the small countries had before joining the European Union, with the exception of 
Croatia and Cyprus. In terms of constant prices, at the end of 2015 all small countries 
had a higher IRC value than in 2000. The exceptions are Denmark and Finland. How-
ever, measured at current prices, all small countries recorded growth in IRC. At the 
same time, the value of IRC for large countries declined from 98.34 in 2000 to 97.96 at 
the end of 2015. This has confi rmed that accession of a relatively small country to a 
large market results in the creation of relatively stronger eﬀ ect of economies of scale 
for it than in the case of accession of a relatively larger country to the same market. 
Strengthening the relative economic power is not necessarily a guarantee of econom-
ic progress of small countries within the European Union. This will be the case if 
GDP of small countries is growing more at the same time as the GDP of the Union 
is increasing. In our case it has been confi rmed. Compared to 2000, GDP of small 
countries grew faster than the GDP growth of the Union and large countries. Also, 
our research has shown that the European Union is a good business environment for 
the former socialist countries in transition. All of them, measured by IRC, except for 
Croatia, have achieved the strengthening of relative economic power in the European 
Union relative to the relative power they had before accession.
The research that we have carried out is limited to the European Union. Changes 
in the concentration of economic power were observed between the member states. In 
this way the relative relationship of the Union to the rest of the world is neglected. To 
get a more complete picture of the relative concentration of economic power within 
the Union in relation to the rest of the world it would be necessary to conduct a similar 
analysis on the relative distribution of the world GDP. Such an analysis would fully 
eliminate the dilemma that can be present in this type of analysis: do small countries 
become relatively stronger because they grow faster or because they weaken more 
slowly from the Union as a whole? Also, such an analysis could provide an answer to 
the question of the relative status of small countries in conditions of globalization of 
the world economy. It will be a subject of a new study. 
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